Local Self-Government in Hungary by Hoffman, István
  
 
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 
B. Brezovnik, I. Hoffman & J. Kostrubiec 
 
 
© The Author(s). Licensee Institute for Local Self-Government Maribor. Distributed 
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 license 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits use, distribution and 
reproduction for non-commercial purposes, provided th original is properly cited.  
 




Abstract The the changing approach on the nature of local governance in 
Hungary is reviewed by this chapter. During the Democratic Transition the 
evolvement of the Hungarian municipal system was based on the paradigm 
and approach of the European Charter of Local Government. Thus one of 
the most autonomous local government system of Europe evolved in 
Hungary. Although the municipal reforms were basically successful, 
several dysfunctional phenomena could be observed and the request for the 
municipal reforms was strong from the late 1990s in Hungary. The new 
constitution of Hungary, the Fundamental Law introduced a new model. 
The approach of the local governance has been transformed: the autonomy 
of the municipalities have been limited. Thus the autonomous nature of the 
Hungarian model changed and new challenges have appeared in the field 
of the implementation of the regulation of the Charter. 
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1 Introduction and history  
 
The Hungarian regulation on local governance has a long tradition. During the feudal 
ages, the local governments of the nobility and other privileged persons (for example the 
bourgeoisie, several privileged ethnicities etc.) had a significant role in the Hungarian 
administration. Practically, these feudal municipalities were the main executive bodies of 
the administration, they were responsible for the law enforcement and they were the lower 
judicial level (1st and – in small cases – 2nd instance) (Mezey et al., 2003: 76-82). At the 
end of the feudal age, a debate emerged on the future role of the municipalities. The 
majority of the Hungarian liberal opposition of the Habsburg administration – the so 
called ‘municipalists’ – wanted to modernize the feudal local governments and their idea 
was a decentralized country. The minority of this liberal opposition – the so called 
‘centralists’ – tried to follow the French (Napoleonic) model and tried to centralize the 
Hungarian administration (Gergely, 2009: 299). 
 
1.1 The beginning of the modern Hungarian municipal system 
 
The modern Hungarian local government system has been evolved after the revolution in 
1848. The legislation of the revolution followed the ‘municipalist’ approach: they began 
to modernize the former feudal municipalities. Because of the fall of the Hungarian 
revolution (and freedom fight against the Habsburg Empire) the Habsburg administration 
was introduced in 1850/51. The Hungarian local self-governments were revived after 
1860 and 1867. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and the establishment of the 
Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy the regulation on local governments belonged to the 
competencies of the Hungarian (royal) administration. The framework of the Hungarian 
municipal system was formed in 1870/71. Firstly, the self-governance of the counties, the 
privileged districts and the towns were guaranteed by the new Act XLII of 1870 on the 
organization of municipal authorities. The former feudal suffrage was abolished by the 
revolutionary acts of 1848. These municipalities had broad responsibilities, and they were 
– partly – the executive bodies of the central government. A new supervision model was 
introduced: the decisions of the municipal bodies were supervised by the Lord Lieutenant 
(főispán) who was appointed by the King at the suggestion of the central government. 
The Lord Lieutenant was the president of the county (district, town) council and he could 
suspend those municipal bodies if they acted illegally. The municipal system was 
transformed partly in 1886. The Act XXI on the municipalities introduced a simplified 
system. The former privileged districts were dissolved, and they were merged into 
counties. Thus three type of the municipalities were established: the counties (megye), the 
unitary authorities (törvényhatósági jogú város) and Budapest royal capital city 
(Budapest székesfőváros). The unitary authorities and the capital city were responsible 
for the competences of the counties and the communities, as well. The communities 
(községek) had a limited self-governance: they were under the administrative tutelage of 
the counties. These communities were classified into three groups by the Act XVIII of 
1871 on the organization of the communities. The small villages belonged to the first 
group. These communities could not perform the tasks of a community independently, 
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therefore they were obliged to form intercommunal cooperation, the so-called circles 
(kör). The large villages belonged to the second group. They could perform the tasks of 
a community independently. The small town (towns with regular council) belonged to the 
third group. Although the regulation was renewed by the legislation of 1886 (Act XXII 
of 1886 on the communities), this system remained practically the same – with some 
amendments in 1929 – until 1950. Thus the governance of the rural areas was based on 
the mandatory intercommunal cooperation of the (small) villages and the broad 
competences and tasks of the counties which were transmitted to the local areas by the 
leader of the districts (which were the agencies of the counties) by the chief constable 
(főszolgabíró) (Hoffman, 2009, pp. 88-92).   
 
1.2 The regulation of the Soviet-type administration  
 
After the World War II a Soviet-type administrative system evolved in Hungary. The self-
governance of the counties, towns and communities were dissolved, the Soviet-type 
councils were defined as the local and regional bodies of the central administration. A 
three-tier system has been established by the Act I of 1950 on the councils: the 
communities (községek) belong to the first tier, the districts (járás) and the towns 
(városok) to the second tier, and the counties and Budapest Capital City to the third tier. 
These entities were directed by the central government. Theoretically the main body of 
these entities were the councils, but the majority of the competences belonged to the 
executive committee (végrehajtó bizottság) of the councils. These executive committee 
were under dual control: they were controlled by their own councils and by the executive 
committee of their superior executive committee (Fonyó, 1976: 452). The former 
municipal properties were nationalized, the councils could be considered only as the 
trustees of the state property (Hoffman, 2009, pp. 105-109). The second Act on the 
councils (Act X of 1954) did not change significantly this model, only the central 
direction became less centralized. This original model transformed significantly after the 
economic and legal reforms of 1968. The third Act on councils (Act I of 1971) were 
passed. Firstly, the self-government nature of the councils were recognized by this act, 
however the councils remain the local and regional agencies of the central government. 
Secondly, the whole system was decentralized, the role of the county councils in the 
direction of the local (town and community councils) have been strengthened. The town 
areas (városkörnyék) were established. The legal status of the districts transformed: the 
district councils were abolished and in the districts the district offices were 
institutionalized. These offices were the agencies of the county councils. Thirdly, the 
merge of the communities was an important process from the 1960s, therefore new 
regulation on the common village councils (községi közös tanács) were institutionalized. 
In this model the former municipalities preserved their formal independency, but their 
whole administrative structure was united, therefore a merged municipality was formed. 
Although merging communities was an important element of the new reforms, the 
intercommunal associations were reborn. The cooperation between towns and villages 
was not solved by the merge of the municipalities, and the town areas were not universal 
in the 1970s. Therefore the town-village associations – which can be classified as 
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intercommunal cooperation (Kiss, 1985) – were established by a normative tool. Fourthly, 
the direction of the subordinate councils became the supervision of them, however the 
judicial remedies against the decision of the supervisory bodies (Hoffman, 2013: 36-38). 
The system was transformed by the territorial reform of 1983 when the district offices 
were dissolved. By this reform the town areas became universal in the rural 
administration. This system existed until 1990. The former centralized structure was 
converted by the evolvement of the new democratic Hungary. 
 
1.3 Democratic municipal system: the Act LXV of 1990 on the local self-
governments  
 
In 1990 a new, local government system was established by the Amendment of the 
Constitution and by the Act LXV of 1990 on the Local Self-Governments (hereinafter: 
Ötv). The Soviet-type system was abolished and the self-governance of the local and 
regional units was recognized.  
 
A very broad municipal autonomy was institutionalized by the Amendment of the 
Constitution. The Article 44/A defined the ‘basic rights’ of the local governments which 
have been guaranteed by the Act XXof 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary(hereinafter: Constitution). These ‘basic right’ should be protected by the 
Constitutional Court and by the courts. Although these guarantees of the local self-
governance were considered as ‘basic rights’ they constitutional protection was lower 
than the human rights. It was highlighted by the Resolution No. 31 of 2014 (published 
September 11th) that these rights – including the essential content of these municipal rights 
– could be restricted by the Act of the Parliament passed with a qualified (two-third) 
majority. The municipal structure was regulated by the Constitution, because the Article 
41 of the Constitution defined the municipal units (communities, towns, capital and its 
districts and the counties). Therefore a very autonomous model evolved in Hungary which 
was based on the concept of ‘inherent rights’.1 This approach was strengthened by the 
definition of the subject to right to local self-government. The article 42 of the 
Constitution stated that the subject to this right is the community of the eligible voters of 
the municipalities. 
 
The scope of the self-governance was defined by a general clause. The article 42 of the 
Constitution stated, that ‘[l]ocal government refers to independent, democratic 
management of local affairs and the exercise of local public authority in the interests of 
the local population’. The concept of ‘local affairs’ was interpreted by the paragraph 2 
section 1 of the Ötv as ‘local public affairs’. This paragraph defined the general clause. 
After the Ötv local public affairs ‘constitute providing local residents with public utilities, 
locally exercising public power through self-government and creating the organizational, 
personnel and financial conditions for these’. 
 
1 The concept of the inherent rights was based on the interpretation of Thomas Jefferson. According to Jefferson, 
the right to self-governance could be interpreted as a collective right of the local communities (Bowman & 
Kearney, 2014: 230-234).  
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The autonomous nature of the Hungarian model was strengthened by another general 
regulations of the Ötv. The principle of subsidiarity prevailed, the priority of the 
municipal responsibility in the field of local public affairs. Thus the paragraph 2 of section 
6 of Ötv stated, that only ‘[u]nder special circumstances, a public affair may be delegated 
to the powers and responsibilities of another organization by an act of Parliament.’ 
 
The new, democratic municipal system was a two-tier, but local-level centered one. The 
first tier was the local (community) level. According to the Ötv villages, large villages, 
towns, county towns and Budapest as the capital city were considered as local-level 
governments (municipalities). The second tier was the county level. The county local 
governments had an intermediate service-provider role, but the county-level service 
delivery could largely be overtaken by the municipalities. The counties lost the majority 
of their former competences and the democratic legitimacy of them was weakened: the 
county assembly was elected indirectly. The unitary authorities were not part of the 
counties. Unitary authorities were formed in those towns which have at least a population 
of 50 000 inhabitants and have regional significance (after 1994 the county seat towns 
were ex lege unitary authorities). The local-centered nature of the Hungarian local 
government system was strengthened by the system of voluntary inter-municipal 
associations. Therefore, the introduction of a compulsory inter-municipal association 
system was very difficult (Verebélyi, 1999, pp. 30-36), almost impossible, due to the need 
for a broad political consensus. 
 
The structure of the municipal administration was transformed. The new structure – the 
municipalities have the freedom of administration within the framework of the central 
regulation – was based on the decisive role of the councils (in communities, towns and in 
the districts of the capital it was called representative body – képviselő-testület – and in 
the unitary authorities, counties and the capital city it was called assembly – közgyűlés). 
The committees of the councils could perform significant competences, but it depended 
basically on the decision of the council. The administrative body of the municipalities 
had a dual leadership. The political leader of the administrative body was the mayor. 
Originally the mayor was elected directly in those municipalities which have less than 
10 000 inhabitants, but after 1994 the mayor became elected indirectly.  The role of the 
mayor was strengthened after 1990. Firstly, it had political reasons, because typically the 
mayor was the leader of the governing party or coalition of the council (Soós & Kákai, 
2011: 535). Secondly, the competencies and the legal status of the mayor has been 
strengthened as well. For example, they were elected indirectly and they had practically 
a suspensive veto power over the decisions of the councils. The administrative body, the 
so called mayor’s office (polgármesteri hivatal) had a professional leader: the municipal 
clerk (jegyző) should have legal or administrative qualifications and practice. The clerks 
were appointed for an indefinite period – following an open call – by the councils on the 
mayor’s proposal. Although the system was dual but the political leaders were factually 
more powerful: they have strong democratic legitimation and they were the employers of 
the clerks (without the right to dismiss and appoint and without the disciplinary rights).  
The right to the municipal property was recognized by the paragraph 2 article 12 of the 
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Constitution. After 1991 the municipal property was established: they became the owner 
of their properties (as I have mentioned, the Soviet-type councils were only the trustees 
of the local state properties). The incomes of the municipalities were based primarily on 
the state aid of the municipal tasks. The municipalities could introduce local taxes but the 
framework of the local taxation (the types of the taxes and their minimum and maximum) 
was defined by the Act C of 1990 on Local Taxes (Péteri, 1993, pp. 112-113). 
 
The relation between the central and local government transformed radically, as well. The 
former direction of the executive committees and the supervision of the councils was 
abolished. The regional (and later the county-level) agencies of the central government 
had only a weak legal control on the decision and operation of the municipal bodies. 
These agencies could not quash or even suspend the execution of the decisions: if they 
found them illegal, then they could initiate the process of the Constitutional Court or the 
courts which have the right to quash the municipal decisions.2 
 
Therefore a very autonomous and democratic municipal system was established during 
the Hungarian Democratic Transition which could be the solid base of the evolvement of 
the local democracy in Hungary (Soós & Kákai, 2011: 547-548). But these changes had 
another side, as well: several dysfunctional phenomena appeared.  
 
1.4 Dysfunctional phenomena of the new municipal system and reform 
attempts after 1990 
 
Meanwhile, local public service systems – which were built on the duties and 
responsibilities of the local governments – had several dysfunctional elements. The main 
dysfunctional element was the fragmented spatial structure which was strengthened by 
democratic changes, as a counterpart to former Communist times: where compulsory 
inter-municipal associations (the above presented common village councils) treated size 
inefficiency problems. This compulsory form was unpopular among Hungarian 
municipalities; therefore, it disappeared with the democratic transition, giving 
opportunity to a disintegration tendency in the transition period (Hoffman, 2009, pp. 130-
132). This fragmentation and the related size inefficiency problem was tried to be solved 
by inter-municipal cooperation. The inter-municipal system of the Ötv was based on 
voluntary cooperation. The new types of associations could not stop the disintegration 
because of their purely voluntary nature and the poor financial support provided by the 
central budget. Therefore, the number of service provider associations was only 120 in 
1992. The joined municipal administrations decreased in these years: the number of 
common municipal clerks was 529 in 1991, 499 in 1994, and only 260 administrative 
inter-municipal associations were established until 1994 (Hoffman, 2011, pp. 30-31). The 
lack of intercommunal cooperation, the fragmented spatial structure, and the weak, 
subsidiary intermediate level public service provider role of the county local governments 
 
2 The municipal decrees could be quashed by the Constitutional Court and the resolutions of the municipal 
bodies could be quashed by the courts (from 1991 to 1999 by the town courts of the county seat towns and after 
1999 by the county courts).  
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resulted in significant service delivery dysfunctions. The local self-governments – 
especially the small villages which were the majority of the Hungarian municipalities – 
were not able to perform a significant part of the municipal tasks. The dysfunctional 
phenomena of the new, democratic system became well recognizable already in 1992-
1993. Therefore, in 1994 a partial review of the regulation took place. The county 
governments were strengthened: the county assemblies were elected directly, and the 
competences of the counties were partly expanded. The democratic legitimacy of the 
county governments were strengthened, as well, therefore the former ‘floating counties’ 
became ‘politics counties’ (Zongor, 2000, pp.19-22). Although the significance of the 
counties changed, important issues remained partly centralized. Thus the regional 
development was just partly decentralized by the reform of the Act XXI of 1996. The 
tasks of the regional development belonged to the competences of the county 
development boards, which bodies were based on the representation of the central and 
local government.  
 
The financial status of the municipalities transformed just partially: the municipal 
bankruptcy was regulated in 1996 by an act of the Parliament (Fábián, 2017, pp. 85). 
 
In 1997 the regulation on inter-municipal associations was changed. Its rules were 
originally kept very scarce to secure a great organizational freedom for municipalities in 
this field. New, additional state subsidies were introduced to accelerate the formation of 
voluntary inter-municipal associations after 1997 (Balázs, 2014, p. 428). As a result of 
these changes, the number of inter-municipal associations radically increased after 1997. 
The joined form of municipal administration was stimulated as well. The establishment 
of common municipal clerks was strongly supported by the central budget. Thus, the 
disintegration tendencies of the local administration stopped at the end of the 1990s, 
giving place to the concentration of the municipal administration in rural areas (Balázs & 
Hoffman, 2017, pp. 11-12). In 2004, the legislator introduced a new type of inter-
municipal association – the multi-purpose micro-regional association – based on the 
French inter-municipal association form ‘SIVOM’. The central government significantly 
supported service delivery through associations: in 2004, the share of the special subsidies 
for them was 1.19% of the whole central government subsidies for local governments, 
and in 2011 it already reached 2.91% (Hoffman, 2011, p. 31). 
 
The Hungarian local public services were influenced by the New Public Management 
paradigm from the late 1990s. The problems of size inefficiency and economies of scale 
were tackled within the municipal system by inter-municipal associations and the 
competition tried to be intensified. One of the greatest debts of concentration reforms 
around the Millennium was the lack of association forms for urban local governments 
(Horváth, 2015, pp. 48-49).  
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2 Constitution and legal foundation for local self-government 
 
The Constitution of the Democratic Transition – which was formally the amendment of 
the former Constitution – was replaced by a new Constitution, the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary (published on April 25th 2011) (hereinafter: Fundamental Law). The new 
Constitution entered into force on January 1st 2012. The constitutional status of the 
Hungarian municipalities were transformed significantly by the new regulation. The 
municipalities are institutionalized by the Fundamental Law of Hungary. An independent 
title (‘Local Governments’) of the Fundamental Law contains the constitutional rules on 
them. This title contains 5 articles. The paragraph 3 article 31 states, that ‘[t]he rules 
relating to local governments shall be laid down in a cardinal Act.',3 thus a strong political 
support of the Parliament is required for the regulation on municipalities.  
 
Although the new regulation is based on the concept of the 'local public affairs' – in 
accordance with the the Article 3 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
(hereinafter: Charter). The paragraph 1 article 31 states that '[i]n Hungary local 
governments shall function to manage local public affairs and exercise local public 
power'. Although the concept of local governance have not changed by the Fundamental 
Law, several important element of the regulation transformed significantly. As it was 
mentioned by the point 1, the tiers and types of the Hungarian municipalities were defined 
by the former constitution. Now the title on local self-governments do not define the 
municipal entities. Similarly, it was regulated by the former Constitution that the local 
governance is a right of the community of the voters of the given municipal entities. These 
rules are not regulated by the Fundamental Law. Therefore the types and tiers of the 
municipalities and the subject of the self-governance can be defined by the (cardinal) act 
on local self-governments.  
 
The most important transformation of the new Fundamental Law is a paradigm shift on 
the concept of the nature of self-governance. The self-governance was interpreted by the 
former Constitution as a fundamental right of the local and regional communities. The 
main competences and liberties of the local self-governments were interpreted as a 
'fundamental rights'. It was highlighted that these municipal rights were not equal to the 
fundamental rights of the persons, but it was clear, that the Constitution of the Democratic 
Transition was based on the concept of inherent rights (Bodnár & Dezső, 2010, pp. 220-
222). These concept has been transformed by the Fundamental Law. The article 32 of the 
Fundamental Law contains the major municipal competences. These competences are not 
defined as 'fundamental municipal rights', and it is highlighted by the new regulation, that 
the municipalities could perform these competences only 'within the framework of an act'. 
These competences are similar to the former 'fundamental municipal rights' and they are 
defined by the paragraph 1 article 32 of the Fundamental Law. Thus the competences of 
the municipalities could be widely limited and restricted by the acts of the Parliament. 
 
3 The cardinal acts should be passed by the two-thirds majority of the members present in Parliament. See 
paragraph 4 article T) of the Fundamental Law.  
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The new regulation is based on the concept of the municipal competences of the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz). The pattern of the paragraph 2 article 28 of the German 
Grundgesetz was followed by the Hungarian regulation. The transformation of the 
interpretation of the municipal competences was highlighted by the Resolution No. 
3105/2014 (published on April 17th) which stated that a municipality cannot file a 
constitutional complain, because they do not have fundamental rights and the 
constitutional complain is the tool of the defense of fundamental rights. The paragraph 1 
article 32 of the Fundamental Law was interpreted as a rule on the municipal competences 
and not on municipal ‘rights’. This interpretation has been confirmed by the Resolution 
3180/2018 (published on June 8th), as well.   
 
Thus the former paradigm – which could be interpreted as an ‘autonomous model’ – 
transformed into a model which could be interpreted as an ‘integrated model’ (after the 
classification of Kjellberg, 1995). This approach is highlighted by the paragraph 1 article 
34 of the Fundamental Law, which states that the ‘[l]ocal governments and state organs 
shall cooperate to achieve community goals.' The integrated approach is mirrored by the 
definition of the Fundamental Law on municipal asset. The municipal asset is interpreted 
by the paragraph 6 article 32 as a ‘public property which shall serve for the performance 
of their tasks.' Thus the municipal asset is practically a 'purpose fund': if the tasks are 
changing, the municipal asset could be transferred to the new body (responsible for the 
task). This concept is strenghtened by the paragraph 1 article 38 of the Fundamental Law: 
the national asset contains the property of the State and of local governments.  
 
Thus the concept of the local governments have been transformed after 2012. A relatively 
wide regulatory freedom on the municipal law has been allowed by the new constitutional 
regulation. The basic structure of the municipal law has not changed. There is a cardinal 
Act on the municipalities, but a new Act was passed after the publication of the 
Fundamental Law. The new Municipal Code is the Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on the Local 
Self-Governments of Hungary (Magyarország helyi önkormányzatairól szóló 2011. évi 
CLXXXIX. törvény – hereinafter Mötv). As part of the transformation of the regulation on 
municipal system the subject of the local governance and the type of the municipalities 
are defined by the Mötv and not by the Fundamental Law. It is defined by the article 2 of 
the Mötv that the local governance is a right of the voters of the communities and the 
counties. Thus the two-tier municipal system has remained: the community and the 
county levels have been institutionalized. Therefore former constitutional rules are 
regulated now by the Mötv. 
 
It is stated by the paragraph 1 article 34 that ‘[a]n Act may set out mandatory functions 
and powers for local governments.' Therefore the mandatory tasks of the municipalities 
are defined by the different Acts on the given sectors. Thus rules on the municipal 
competences are incoporated into several (sectoral) acts. For example the mandatory tasks 
of the municipalities in the field of social care is defined by the Act III of 1993 on the 
Social Administration and on the Social Benefits. The municipal educational 
competences are regulated by the Act CXC of 2011 on the National Public Education. 
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 




The exectuive regulation on the municipal tasks could be regulated by Government and 
– partly – by ministerial decrees after the paragraph 1 article 14 of Mötv.  
 
The Hungarian regulation on the comstitutional and legal foundation for local self-
government is based on the article 2 of the Charter. The new constitution of Hungary, the 
Fundamental Law have a title on the status of the local self-government. The major rules 
on municipalities are defined by an independent Municipal Code, by the Mötv which is a 
cardinal act (an act should be passed by the two-third majority of the Parliament). The 
regulation on mandatory municipal tasks should be regulated by Acts of the Parliament. 
The Government of Hungary and the ministers could pass only exectuive decrees on the 
detailed regulations of these obligatory tasks. Thus the Hungarian regulation is in 
accordance with the article 2 of the Charter but it should be highlighted that the approach 
was tranformed by the new Constitution. The types of the municipalities and the subject 
of the right to local governance is now defined by the Mötv and not by the Constitution, 
thus the constitutional defense of the municipal system has been weakened.  
 
3 Scope of local self-government  
 
The Hungarian municipal system is based on the general clause of local public affairs. 
As I have mentioned, the article 31 of the Fundamental Law states that the local 
governments have general powers in local public affairs. As I have mentioned, the basic 
competences of the municipalities are defined by the paragraph 1 article 32 of the 
Fundamental Law. 4  Thus, in the management of local public affairs and within the 
framework of an Act, local governments: a) shall adopt decrees; b) shall take decisions; 
c) shall autonomously administer their affairs; d) shall determine the rules of their 
organization and operation; e) shall exercise the rights of ownership with respect to local 
government property; f) shall determine their budgets and autonomously manage their 
affairs on the basis thereof; g) may engage in entrepreneurial activities with their assets 
and revenues available for this purpose, without jeopardizing the performance of their 
mandatory duties; h) shall decide on the types and rates of local taxes; i) may create local 
government symbols and establish local decorations and honorific titles; j) may request 
information from the organ vested with the relevant functions and powers, initiate 
decisions or express an opinion; k) may freely associate with other local governments, 
 
4 See paragraph 1 article 32 of the Fundamental Law: ’In the management of local public affairs and within the 
framework of an Act, local governments: a) shall adopt decrees; b) shall take decisions; c) shall autonomously 
administer their affairs; d) shall determine the rules of their organization and operation; e) shall exercise the 
rights of ownership with respect to local government property; f) shall determine their budgets and 
autonomously manage their affairs on the basis thereof; g) may engage in entrepreneurial activities with their 
assets and revenues available for this purpose, without jeopardizing the performance of their mandatory duties; 
h) shall decide on the types and rates of local taxes; i) may create local government symbols and establish local 
decorations and honorific titles; j) may request information from the organ vested with the relevant functions 
and powers, initiate decisions or express an opinion; k) may freely associate with other local governments, 
establish associations for the representation of their interests, cooperate with local governments of other 
countries within their functions and powers, and become members of international organizations of local 
governments; l) shall exercise further functions and powers laid down in an Act.' 
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 




establish associations for the representation of their interests, cooperate with local 
governments of other countries within their functions and powers, and become members 
of international organizations of local governments; l) shall exercise further functions and 
powers laid down in an Act.  
 
The framework of the general powers are defined by the concept of ‘local public’ affairs 
and by legislation. The municipalities have general powers in the field of their local public 
affairs. This concept is interpreted by the section 4 of the Mötv. Thus the concept of local 
public affairs have three elements. Firstly, the provision of the local public services 
belongs to the local public affairs. Thus the performance of the local public services are 
primarily municipal competences, the municipalities main function is to provide the basic 
services for the local population. Secondly, ‘local governance and the cooperation with 
the local population’ is interpreted as local public affairs. Thus the municipalities could 
exercise public powers and the forms of local direct and indirect democracy is interpreted 
as local public affairs, as well. Similarly, the organizational, personnel and material 
resources of these tasks is defined as local public affair, and belong to the competences 
of the municipalities. Another important element of the constitutional regulation that this 
local public affair could be limited by the legislation (Szente, 2013, 154-155).  
 
Thus the municipalities have general powers in local public affairs and within the 
framework of an act – actually under the law. Thus the responsibilities of the 
municipalities can be restricted by the central legislation, however the limit of this 
restriction could be the 'competences guaranteed by the Fundamental Law [see Decision 
No. 47 of 1991 (published on September 24th) of the Constitutional Court of Hungary].  
 
Two major group can be distinguished among the tasks performed by the municipalities 
and the bodies of the municipalities.  
 
3.1 Municipal tasks  
 
The municipal tasks belongs to the first group and the so called delegated tasks. The 
mandatory municipal tasks, the alternative municipal tasks and the facultative municipal 
tasks can be distinguished within the municipal tasks. The major responsibilities of the 
municipalities are defined by the section 13 of Mötv. This section is not a rule by which 
the competences are directly installed, but it can be interpreted as an open list which 
defines the framework of the task performance of the Hungarian municipal system. This 
open enumeration is interpreted as a list of the possible and typical tasks of the different 
types and tiers of the Hungarian local government system. As I have mentioned, the actual 
municiapl competences and mandatory tasks are regulated by the sectoral acts.  
 
Another general rule on the scope of the municipalities are the concept of the 
differentiated installation of powers and responsibilities. The legal status of the Hungarian 
municipalities are equal, but their tasks and responsibilities could be different because of 
the different size and economic capacity. Thus the section 11 of the Mötv states that the 
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different types of the municipalities – the communities, the towns, the district-seat towns 
and the county towns – could have different tasks. It is a legal prescription that the 
legislator should define the mandatory tasks of these municipalities different. The 
economic capacity, the population, the area of the municipalities should be considered by 
the legislators when the mandatory tasks are defined (Nagy & Hoffman, 2016, pp. 67-
70).  
 
Obligatory municipal tasks are defined by act having. According to a significant 
modification of the regulation, new instruments of legal supervision could guarantee the 
fulfilment of these tasks. Beyond the new instruments of legal supervision the 
differentiated installation of tasks is required. Although this differentiation was allowed 
by the Act LXV of 1990 on Local Self-Governments, it is required by the New Municipal 
Code. Thus the tasks of the diverse municipalities should be defined differently by the 
sector/special regulations. The main criteria of this installation of tasks are determined by 
Act CLXXXIX on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary. Thus 1. the nature of the 
duty, 2. the different capability of the local governments, especially the different 
economic performance, population and the size of the area of the municipality shall be 
taken into account (section 11(2) of the New Municipal Code). The personnel, the 
material and the financial conditions of the performance of the obligatory tasks (public 
services) can be regulated not only by acts, but also by the decrees of the Hungarian 
Government and by the decrees of the ministers after these general rules of the municipal 
law. This right of the central government to regulate the conditions of (local) public 
services is not unconditional: Resolution 47/1991. (24th September) of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court declared that the decree which entirely excludes the free decision of 
the local government breaches the constitution. The performance of the obligatory 
municipal tasks has priority because the performance of these duties must not be 
jeopardized by the performance of the facultative tasks of local governments.  
 
Thanks to the continental (general clause) approach of the Hungarian local government 
system, these tasks may be performed which are not required by acts: namely the 
facultative tasks of the local governments. I have mentioned that the main aim of the 
municipalities is the fulfilment of the obligatory tasks, thus local governments can 
provide these tasks if strict legal conditions are met. As I have mentioned, municipalities 
can perform as a facultative task only local public affairs. Local governments could 
perform such a task which is not among the responsibilities of the central government. 
Therefore the Constitutional Court declared that a local government decree by which a 
city policy (with the powers and duties of the – state – police) was established is a breach 
of the constitution [Res. No. 8/1996. (23rd February) of the Constitutional Court]. 
Secondly, the performance of facultative tasks cannot be contrary to the law. As was 
mentioned above, obligatory tasks have priority. The performance of facultative tasks can 
be funded only by own revenues of the local governments and by special central subsidies 
for these tasks determined by the (annual) Act on the Budget of Hungary. Thus Hungary 
has a unified state police system, where the police are maintained and directed by the 
central government. However, special regulations regarding the tasks of local public 
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safety are determined by the Act on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary. 
Municipalities are allowed by the new Municipal Code to establish bodies responsible for 
local public safety and for the preservation of local government assets. This body can use 
force determined by acts. This task is obviously facultative. Because the use of force, the 
central government has stronger supervision: the (state) police have not only legal but 
technical supervision powers, as well. Therefore the municipality should establish 
agreements with the police (Fábián & Hoffman, 2014, pp. 327-329).  
 
The third element of the municipal tasks is alternative (voluntarily assumed) tasks. This 
type of municipal task has evolved in the “border area” of the obligatory and facultative 
tasks in the European municipal systems. These tasks could be defined as a “correction 
tool” of the differentiated installation of tasks. The possibility of the voluntary assumption 
of the tasks of the county level local government or those settlement level municipalities 
which have a larger population or greater economic power could solve the inelasticity of 
the differentiated tasks system determined by central regulation (by acts). In the European 
municipal systems this opportunity was regulated by sector/special acts. Although the 
European acts on local self-governments have not contained this type of the tasks, the 
Hungarian municipal law allows and it has been regulated by the Hungarian municipal 
codes. This specialty of the Hungarian regulation remained, however it was transformed 
significantly. The first tier (community-level) municipalities and their inter-municipal 
associations can voluntarily assume the obligatory tasks of those first tier municipalities 
which have greater economic capacity or larger population, if 1. the transfer of tasks is 
justified by the needs of the population of the (smaller) municipalities, and 2. after the 
assumption the public services are provided more efficiently and at least on the same 
professional standard, and 3. supplementary state subvention is not required for the 
performance. The tasks of the second-tier (county) municipalities cannot be assumed. If 
these requirements are fulfilled the tasks are assumed by the decree of the municipality 
(or by the resolution of the inter-municipal cooperation). The procedure and the 
conditions are legally supervised by the County Government Office. Financing of the 
alternative tasks is similar to the obligatory tasks: the assuming municipalities get the 
same amount from the central budget as those municipalities which should compulsorily 
perform these services. A special type of the alternative tasks is if the tasks of the central 
government are assumed by a local government. A strong limit of the municipal task 
performance is that a local government project funded by the European Union could be 
completed by the Government for the fulfilment of the national obligation to the European 
Union – despite against the will of the given local government. This right is the final 
guarantee of the compliance with the national obligations because Member States are 
responsible for these obligations and are represented by their Governments. Thus, 
primarily the central governments are responsible for the offences of the local 
governments. Therefore the Government of Hungary has this right. Municipalities have 
legal remedies against these decisions (Nagy & Hoffman, 2016, pp. 80-82). The 
resolution of the Government of Hungary can be (judicially) revised by the Budapest-
Capital Regional Court. 
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3.2 Delegated tasks 
 
It has been widely allowed by the Hungarian municipal law for the officers of the local 
governments to perform central government tasks by the officers of the local 
governments. If the officers make a decision in their delegated power, this decision cannot 
be considered as a municipal decision. Therefore, the municipal bodies and organs cannot 
direct this officer. The reason of for the transfer of power is the efficient and grassroots 
public administration. There are powers and duties which have to be performed at the 
settlement level but it is not efficient if the central government had has agencies in every 
settlements.  
 
Because the delegated nature of these powers, the territorial central government agencies 
have not only legal but technical supervision rights. These agencies are the supervising 
organs of  local government officers, which supervision is regulated by the Act CXXVI 
of 2010 on the County Government Offices.  
 
Although the number of the cases, in which the officers of the local government have had 
duties in delegated power, was reduced by the establishment of the District Government 
Offices in 2013, these officers play an important role in the Hungarian regulatory 
activities.  
 
Originally the mayor and the president of the county council could perform delegated 
duties by according to the original text of the paragraph 3 article 34 of the Fundamental 
Law. The Government Resolution No. 1299/2011. (published on 1st September) on the 
Establishment of the Districts was in line with this approach. The separation of the 
municipal and central government tasks was planned by the sub point 2. j) of that 
Resolution. The rigid separation of these tasks was not fulfilled: the delegated powers of 
the municipal clerks (jegyző) were allowed by paragraph 2 article 28 of the Transitional 
Provisions of the Fundamental Law (published on 31st December 2011). This was a 
limitation, because formerly the mayor, the clerks and the officers of the Mayor’s Office 
could perform these powers. The original state of the regulation has been restored by the 
Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law (published on 25th March 2013) which 
affected paragraph 3 article 34 of the Fundamental Law. Thus the mayor, the president of 
the county council, the clerk and the officer (civil servant) of the Mayor’s Office could 
perform delegated powers and duties. A significant change is that the right of the central 
government has been limited by the Fundamental Law. The differences between the 
municipal and delegated administrative tasks are shown by the following table.  
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Table 1: Municipal and delegated regulatory cases  
 
 Municipal regulatory cases Delegated regulatory cases 
Related to… Local public affair National or general public 
affair 
Which type of legal norms 
could define it?  
Act of the Parliament, Decree 
of the Local Self-Government 
Act of the Parliament, 
Governmental decree issued 
under the authority of an act  
Acting authority  Representative Body ; 
under the authorization of the 
representative body the 
mayor, the clerk, the 
committee of the 
representative body and the 
inter-municipal association 
Mayor, clerk, officer (civil 
servant) of the Mayor’s Office; 
by the agreement of the local 
governments, the inter-
municipal association  
Remedies If 1st instance is the 
representative body, then 
remedy to the court 
(Administrative and Labour 
Court)  
If 1st instance is the mayor, 
committee, clerk or inter-
municipal association, then 
appeal to the representative 
body (after the 2nd instance 
decision of the representative 
body: remedy to the court) – 
according to the article 142/A 
of the Mötv.  
Appeal  
if the 1st sentence is the mayor, 
(municipal) clerk, officer 
(civil servant) of the Mayor’s 
Office, the 2nd instance is in 
principle the County 
Government Office, but 
another supervising authority 
can be defined by an Act or by 
a Decree of the Government 
(article 44 of the Act No. 
CXXV of 2018 on 
Government Administration)  
Role of the County 
Government Office  
It is not covered by the legal 
supervision, either.  
Supervising authority under 
the article 44 of the Act No. 
CXXV of 2018. 
Source: own editing  
 
4 Protection of local authority boundaries  
 
Formerly the main regulation on the boundaries of the municipal authorities were defined 
by an independent act, by the Act XLI of 1999 on the Land Management. Now the 
regulation on the boundaries and on the establishment of the municipal units are 
integrated into the Mötv. The main rules on them are defined by the Chapter V of the 
Mötv. Although the norms of the land management are part of the general Municipal 
Code, these regulation are declared as non-cardinal rules which van be passed and amend 
by the simple majority of the Members of Parliament.5 The Act on the Local Self-
 
5 In Hungary the cardinal rules of the different acts are defined by the acts. Thus the majority of the Hungarian 
cardinal acts are just partially cardinal: they contain several articles which should be passed or amended with 
simple majority of the Parliament (Jakab & Fröhlich, 2017, pp. 425-426).  
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Governments of Hungary states that the local voters of the villages and towns (first tier 
or community local governments) and the counties (county local governments) has the 
right to self-governance. Firstly, a local community can have in that case autonomy in 
that case, if it is classified as a village, or as a town or as a county. These questions are 
regulated by the Chapter V of Mötv. Secondly, the scope of the municipalities are 
determined by their borders. Therefore the definition of the municipal borders are an 
important element on the autonomy of the municipalities. Therefore several guarantees 
and standards are defined by the article 5 of the Charter. In the following the regulation 
on the land management in Hungary will be reviewed. In the Hungarian law the land 
management has different topics: firstly, the establishment of the municipal units and 
secondly the rules on the change of the boundaries of local governments. In the following 
the regulation on these topics will be reviewed in the system of the Hungarian regulation.  
 
4.1 Declaration (establishment) of a village  
 
The smallest unit which has the right to self-governance is the village in Hungary. The 
Mötv does not contain any definition of the village.6 Only the conditions of the 
declaration of village are determined by the municipal law. Thus the declaration shall be 
initiated by  local voters of a geographically and architecturally separated, populated area, 
which unit is able to the exercise  the right to self-governance and is able to perform and 
organize the municipal tasks without the decline of the service standards. The village can 
be established if these conditions are met by the remained and the newly established 
settlement, as well. Before the declaration of a village a local referendum shall be held: 
the whole population of the “old” settlement (and not only the population of the populated 
area which wants to be a new village) shall be involved. Other conditions of the 
declaration are that the population of the separated populated area has increased in the 
last ten years, the infrastructure is more developed than the national average and the 
municipal tasks are provided performed at lower costs by the local government than the 
national average. The aim of these very strict conditions has been to slow down the 
increasing number of municipal units. These conditions can be fulfilled very hardly, 
therefore, the number of the villages have not changed since 2013 (Rozsnyai, 2013, pp. 
39-40).7 The conditions and requirements are examined by the minister responsible for 
the legal supervision of the local governments (in the current Government system this 
minister is the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office). The decision of the minister can 
be judicially reviewed by the Budapest-Capital Administrative and Labour Court. If the 
minister supports the lawful initiative, the village could be declared by the President of 
the Republic. The President can review the legality of the proposal and can deny it. There 
is not remedy against the decision of the President.  
 
 
6 The last legal act which defined the village was the – the last act which contained this definition was the Act 
XLII of 1870 on the communities (Beluszky, 2004, pp. 149-151).   
7 The last declaration (establishment) of village was made in 2013. This last decision was the establishment of 
Village Balatonakarattya by the Resolution of the President of the Republic No. 13 of 2013 (published on 
January 13th).   
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4.2 Amalgamation of the municipalities 
 
Villages and towns which have been built together can initiate their amalgamation. This 
results practically the termination of the former municipalities and the establishment of a 
new local self-government which is the (legal) successor of the former settlements. The 
amalgamation of the municipalities are is declared by the President of the Republic on a 
proposal of the minister responsible for the legal supervision of the local self-
governments. Because the subject of the right to local self-governance is changed by the 
amalgamation of the municipalities, local referendum shall be held.  
 
4.3 Replacement of the parts of the communities (transformation of the 
municipal boundaries) 
 
The subject of the local self-governance could be partially change when the boundaries 
of the municipalities change. These changes can be initiated only by the municipalities, 
the central government could not transform these boundaries after the regulation of the 
Mötv. Because of the partial change of the subject of right to self-governance if habited 
parts of the towns and villages are affected by the boundary changes, local referendum 
shall be held. Because the right to self-governance is not affected by the replacement of 
uninhabited parts of the municipalities, therefore it can be decided by the resolutions of 
the representative bodies (councils) of the given municipalities. The change of the 




The Mötv states that the representative body of a village which have has a central role 
and reaches the average urban development can initiate the declaration of a town. A 
community is declared town by the President of the Republic on a proposal of the minister 
responsible for the legal supervision of the local self-governments. The towns should 
provide services – which are defined by an Act – not only for their population but for the 
population of their agglomerations. County towns are the seat towns of the counties and 
the towns which were declared county towns before 31stDecember 2012.8 The district 
headquarters’ towns are assigned by a Government decree – which is now the 
Government Decree No. 86/2019. (published on April 23rd) on the County Government 
Offices and on the District Offices.  
 
4.5 Counties and the Capital of Hungary  
 
The territory, the name and the seat towns of the counties and the Capital and the system 
of the metropolitan districts of the Capital are determined by the Parliament. Because of 
the change of the subject of the local government in several cases, a local referendum is 
 
8 There are five county towns which are not the seats of their counties: Dunaújváros, Érd, Hódmezővásárhely, 
Nagykanizsa and Sopron.  
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required before the decision of the legislator. In the case of the change of the name of the 
county, the county government could give an opinion on it. The metropolitan district 
system of the Capital is defined by an Act of the Parliament which is based on the 
initiatives of the given metropolitan municipalities. The regulation is consistent with the 
article 5 of the Charter but this rule can be overwritten by the Amendment of the Mötv. 
Thus a new type of the metropolitan administrative units were established by an 
Amendment of the Mötv in 2013: the Margitsziget as directly managed territory of the 
Capital Government. This territory formerly belonged to the 13th District of the Capital. 
The constitutional complaint of the Metropolitan District Government was rejected 
because constitutional complaint could be filed on the basis of the offense of the 
fundamental rights, and the – as I have mentioned earlier – the guarantees of the self-
governance are not interpreted as fundamental rights by the new Fundamental Law [see 
Decision No. 3105/2014. (published on April 17th) of the Constitutional Court].   
 
Thus the regulation of the Mötv is based on the article 5 of the Charter. If the subject of 
the local government changes local referendum is required. The majority of the land 
management procedures are based on the initiatives of the municipalities. But these rules 
could be circumvented by the amendment of the Mötv, because these rights are 
guaranteed by the Mötv.  
 
5 Administrative structures and resources for the tasks of local authorities  
 
The administrative structure of the local authorities is based on the point d) paragraph 2 
article 32 of the Fundamental Law, which declares, that the municipalities shall “within 
the framework of law …determine its organizational structure and rules of operation”. 
Thus the local authorities have great freedom to institutionalize new local bodies, but the 
framework of the local administrative structure is defined – in a very detailed form – by 
the Municipal Code (Mötv). The organizational freedom of the municipalities have been 
recognized by the Hungarian Constitutional Court and by the Curia, as well. It is stated 
that the bodies defined by the Mötv should be formed. According to this approach the 
Decision No. 22/2015 (published on June 18th) stated that this freedom is “within the 
framework of law”, thus the central legislation can institutionalize municipal bodies. 
Another limit of this freedom is, that the municipal tasks should be fulfilled by the 
municipal administration. If the local administrative system do not fulfil their tasks the 
central government and the county government offices have the opportunity to form 
several bodies – within the framework of the regulations of the Mötv. Thus this resolution 
stated that the establishment of the joint municipal office by the county government 
offices does not conflict with the provision of the Charter. The common municipal offices 
– as it will be shown later – are established by the given municipalities. If these 
municipalities do not form this – mandatory type inter-municipal associations – the 
county government offices have the right to appoint the communities which are part of 
this cooperation. Because of Constitutional regulation and the ultima ratio nature of this 
power, it basically complies with the provisions of the article 6 of the Charter. But it was 
against the Charter that the opinion of the municipalities should not be asked during this 
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procedure. Therefore the Hungarian Constitutional Court stated that the lack of the rules 
on the procedure for asking the opinion of municipalities is an unconstitutional omission. 
The deadline for the remedy of the omission was December 15th 2015, but the new 
regulation was passed only by the Act CXXI of 2018 (which entered into force on January 
1st 2019. 
 
Although the central legislation is a strong limit of the organizational freedom of the 
municipalities, the Decision No. 834/B/2003 stated that the municipalities could form 
such bodies which are not institutionalized by an Act of the Parliament and which fulfil 
municipal tasks. Therefore it was stated that the institutionalization of the fractions of a 
county town assembly is consistent with the freedom of the organizational freedom. 
Another limit is, that the fulfilled task should be a local task: if the task does not belong 
to the municipal tasks, the establishment of the local body is unconstitutional. Therefore 
the Decree of the Town Municipality of Gyula No. 20/1993. (published on April 19th) on 
the Town Police of Gyula was annulled by the Decision No. 8/1996. (published on 
February 23rd) because the tasks of the Town Police belonged to the tasks of the 
Hungarian (state) Police, and therefore these competences were not ‘local public affairs’.  
 
Within the above mentioned constitutional framework the central body of the Hungarian 
local government is the representative body (in the counties, in the county towns and in 
the capital the assembly). The municipalities are represented by the representative bodies 
which are practically the councils of the Hungarian municipalities. The decision of the 
representative body can be of two types, namely a decree or a resolution. A decree is a 
legal act (law) which cannot be contrary to other legal regulations; thus it is at the lowest 
level among the legal hierarchy. Local governments can adopt a decree in their own right 
in accordance with article 32(2) of the Fundamental Law, which allows local governments 
to publish legal regulations in their duties. Local governments can be authorized to adopt 
a decree by an Act (of the Parliament), as well. The decrees are signed by the mayor and 
the clerk. The publication of the local government decree is different from the publication 
of the central legislation. It shall be published in the official gazette of the local 
government, or if the local government does not have an official gazette, it shall be 
published in the manner customary for the locality. Since 2013/2014 the decrees of local 
governments shall be available on the National Law Library, which can be accessed on 
the Internet (www.njt.hu). As I have mentioned earlier, the representative body has only 
municipal tasks and duties; it cannot have delegated administrative tasks. Duties of the 
representative body can be classified as non-transferable duties, in which only the 
representative body can make decisions; and transferable duties, which can be delegated 
to the mayor, the committee, the representative body of the sub-municipal entities, he 
inter-municipal associations and to the clerk. (Fábián & Hoffman, 2014, pp. 337-339). 
The chairman or chairwoman of the representative body is the mayor. If the mayor is 
unable to attend to his or her responsibilities, he or she is substituted by one of the deputy 
mayor who has been elected for councillors. The representative body shall convene as 
needed, as often as is called for in the organizational and operational regulations but at 
least six times per year. The representative body shall hold an announced advanced public 
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hearing at least one time per year. The session of the representative body (council) is in 
principle public. The Local Government Council of the Curia states in the Res. No. 
Köf.5.036/2012/6. that “the public of the exercise of power is the basis for the democratic 
operation and it is the cornerstone of the operation governed by the rule of law”. There 
are three options defined by the Mötv in which the council has to or shall or may convene 
in camera. The representative body has a quorum if more than half of the councillors are 
present at the session. The Local Government Council of the Curia stated in the Res. No. 
Köf.5.003/2012/9. that the participation shall be in person, which does not allow a session 
to hold a session by video conference or to a vote to be sent by letter or by other mode.9 
The quorum shall be observed maintained continuously during the session. The 
representative body makes a decision by simple or by qualified majority. The majority is 
simple if the proposal is supported by the majority of the present councillors. The majority 
is qualified if the proposal is supported by the majority of the elected councillors. A 
qualified majority is needed for example for the adoption of a local government decree, 
for the establishment of an inter-municipal cooperation or institution, the exclusion of a 
councilor or to establish the a conflict of interest or the indignity (see section 50 of the 
Mötv). Protocol shall be prepared on the sessions of the representative body which is 
signed by the mayor and by the clerk, and it will be sent to the supervising authority, to 
the county (metropolitan) government office within 15 days after the session. 
 
Representative bodies can establish committees for more efficient and faster decision 
making and for the adequate control. Establishment of the committees can be required by 
an act (of the Parliament). The Act on Local Self-Governments of Hungary contains such 
a rule, as well.  The community having a population of at least 2000 people shall establish 
an economic committee according to the order of section 57(2) of the new Municipal 
Code. Villages having a population of maximum 100 people cannot establish committees 
and villages having a population of maximum 1000 people can establish only one 
committee which can fulfil duties of all committees which establishment is required by 
the law. Sub-municipal councils can be established, which are interpreted as special 
committees of the representative bodies.  
 
The personal and political leader of the municipality is the mayor, who have been elected 
indirectly since 1994.10 The mayor has significant powers. First of all, the mayor is the 
chairperson of the representative body, several personal decisions are determined by the 
mayor: for example, the mayor has the right to nominate the deputy mayors and the 
members of the committees of the representative bodies. The mayor has a suspensive veto 
on the decisions of the representative body. The veto of the mayor has been strengthened 
by the regulation of the Mötv: if a decision is vetoed, the representative body could accept 
it with a qualified majority. The representative body is represented by the mayor. The 
 
 
10 From 1990 to 1994 the mayors of the municipalities with more than 10 000 inhabitants were elected by the 
representative body. The only exception is the election of the personal and political leader of the county 
government. The chairperson of the county assemblies are elected by the county assembly (Nagy & Hoffman, 
2016, pp. 120-124). 
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mayor could accept in special cases – defined by the organizational and operational rules 
of the municipality – substitute decisions by which resolutions the decisions of the 
representative bodies are substituted. Secondly, the mayor s the leader of the municipal 
decision-making. The county clerk (jegyző), the professional leader of the municipal 
office (or joint office) is appointed by the mayor, and the mayor is the employer of the 
clerk. Thus the municipal office (which is called ‘mayor’s office’) dependent on the 
mayor. The mayor has several municipal and delegated state administration powers, as 
well (Nagy & Hoffman, 2016, pp. 264-265). Thus the model of the administrative 
structure of the Hungarian municipalities were centralized by the Mötv: the personal 
political leadership has been strengthened.  
 
The professional leader of the municipal decision-making is the municipal clerk. The 
clerk is a qualified (in the field of law and management studies) civil servant and he or 
she is appointed by the mayor for an indefinite term. Formerly, the clerk was appointed 
by the representative body, but in the new model, the clerk is practically a high-ranking 
subordinate of the mayor. The clerk has different tasks. First of all, he is the clerk is the 
professional leader of the municipal office: he or she is the employer of the civil servants, 
but her or his employer’s right is limited by the right of consent of the mayor. Secondly, 
the clerk is a professional legal advisor of the representative body: he clerk is responsible 
for the minutes of the sessions of the representative body and he or she shall signalize if 
the representative body would break the law. Thirdly, the clerk can fulfil several 
municipal tasks – defined by municipal decrees – and he or she is the representative of 
the central government in the different communities: he or she has several state 
administration tasks.  
 
The municipal office – which is called ‘mayor’s office’ (polgármesteri hivatal) – hasn’t 
own responsibilities, this body is the decision-making body of the mayor and the 
municipal clerk. In the small Hungarian municipalities a mandatory integration pf these 
bodies was established by the regulation of the Mötv: these municipalities shall form joint 
municipal offices (see later in point 9). The employees of these offices are professional 
public servants.  
 
Thus the municipalities have the right to establish own municipal bodies within the 
framework of the Act of Parliament and within the framework of their own municipal 
tasks. The administrative structure is strongly determined by the central legislation. The 
structure has transformed in the last decade: the mayor, as a personal political leader has 
been strengthened by the Mötv. The significance of decision-making of the representative 
body and the professional leadership of the municipal clerk has been weakened. The roots 
of these changes were the strong politicization of the municipal administration and the 
eminent role of the mayor of the local party politics. Now the former informal structures 
have been the base of the new regulation and the informal structures turned to formal 
models.  
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 




6 Conditions under which responsibilities at local level are exercised 
 
The mandate of the councillors begins by a vote. Since 2014 the term of the mayors and 
the councillors has been five years (until 2014 it was four years).  
 
The councillors are primarily directly elected. In the municipalities which have more than 
10 000 inhabitants approx.. 75% of the councillors are elected directly in constituencies, 
but approx.. 25% of the councillors are elected by a compensation list (the losing votes 
are considered in principle in this list). In the municipalities less than 10 000 inhabitant 
there are just one constituency, and the local voters have multiple vote. The constituencies 
are based on the first-past-the-post (FTPT) model, thus the Hungarian local democracy is 
based on the majoritarian democracy (Sóos & Kákai, 2011, pp. 537-538). The county 
councils are elected by a proportional system which is based on party-lists. The mandate 
of the councillors are free and the councillors cannot be recalled by the voters.  
 
The representative body starts its current operation by its opening session. The end of 
the mandate is in principle the opening session of the representative body elected by the 
next general local elections. The mandate of the representative body can be ended before 
the end of general term, if the representative body is dissolved by the qualified majority 
decision of this body. There are time limitations for the dissolution decision: it cannot be 
within six month of the local general elections and after the 30th November of the year 
before the next general local election. As it was previously mentioned, the representative 
body can be dissolved by the Parliament if the representative body breach the constitution 
by through its operation or by through the lack of the (municipal) operation. 
 
The mandate of councillors can be ended end before the next general local elections, in 
the following cases: 
a) the councillor lost his or her right to vote, 
b) conflicts of interest are stated, 
c) the indignity of the councillor is stated, 
d)  absentee termination: if the councillor is absent  from the sessions of the 
representative body for a one year period, 
e) the councillor resigns, 
f) the representative body is dissolved by itself or by the Parliament, 
g) the councillor dies.  
 
The cases of the incompatibility is defined by the Mötv. Three major cases can be 
distinguished: the incompatibility of another state and municipal post, economic 
incompatibility and incompatibility caused by managerial role in a media services (Nagy 
& Hoffman, 2016, pp. 161-162). The procedure on incompatibility is regulated by the 
Mötv. The decisions of the municipal councils can reviewed by the administrative and 
labour courts.  
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The councillors (and the members of the committees) are entitled to honorarium and to 
benefits in kind. The actual measure of these benefits are defined by municipal decree. 
The upper limit of these benefits are not defined by the Mötv. Just a general clause is in 
the Municipal Code: the mandatory tasks of the municipalities cannot be jeopardized by 
the high measure of the benefits. This rule is actually based on the situation of the small 
municipalities, which have just limited resources. It is stated by the Mötv that the 
presidents of the committees, the municipal commissioners could receive a higher amount 
of honorarium. The councillors are entitled to compensation if they have expenses 
incurred in the exercise of the office. The costs should be verified by invoices and the 
compensation is permitted by the mayor.  
 
Thus the Hungarian regulation is based on the rules of the Charter and it gives a relatively 
great freedom for the municipalities to institutionalize and regulate these benefits and 
salaries. Thus a diversified model has been developed in Hungary, which depends on the 
size of the municipality, the duties on them, and on the local financial resources. 
Sometimes the model is based on the local political situation, as well.   
 
7 Administrative supervision of local authorities' activities 
 
The In principle, monitoring the legality of local government decisions is fundamentally 
divided between two different jurisdictions: arbitration on individual local government 
decisions is the responsibility of the judge, although any action on local administrative 
general decisions is – in principle – under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court or the Curia of Hungary Kovács, 2017: 428; Nagy, 2017: 24-25). The 
Constitutional Court is charged with verifying the constitutionality of local government 
decrees. The Curia (The Supreme Court of Hungary) is charged with the verifying that 
local government decrees are in compliance with the legislation and with the decrees of 
the central government. In regard to the supervision of normative acts, there is no actio 
popularis, the procedure of the Constitutional Court can be initiated by the Government 
of Hungary, by the quarter of the members of the Parliament, by the president of the 
Curia, the Prosecutor General and by the ombudsman. A judge can initiate the 
constitutional review of a local government decree, if the violation of the Fundamental 
law is suspected by the judge. Similarly, the judicial review of the local government 
decrees can be initiated by the leader of the county government office, by the ombudsman 
and by a judge of a litigation who suspends, that the applicable decree is unlawful.  
 
The legality of the municipal decisions are legally supervised by the county government 
offices. The actions, the decision-making procedure and the omission of the 
municipalities are supervised by the county government offices. In case of resolutions 
taken within local discretionary power, the head of the county government office could 
only control the legality of the decision, not its effectiveness nor its merits.Within the 
scope of its powers in the field of review of legality, the county government office may  
1. issue a legal notice; 
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2. initiate the convocation of the representative body or the council of the inter-
municipal association; 
3. propose that the minister responsible for the legal supervision of the municipalities 
to initiate the submission of a Government proposal requesting the Constitutional 
Court to review the constitutionality of a local government decree; 
4. initiate the review of the local government’s resolution at an administrative and 
labour court  
5. initiate the commencement of an administrative litigation against a representative 
body for an omission in decision-making or task performance obligation and for 
oredering substitute decision-making; 
6. propose to the minister responsible for the legal supervision of the municipalities  to 
initiate submission of a proposal by the Government for the dissolution of any 
representative body breaching the Fundamental Law;  
7. initiate at the Hungarian State Treasury the withholding or withdrawal of a specific 
part of a state subsidy, defined by the Act of Parliament, due from the national 
budget; 
8. file a suit against a mayor who commits serial violations, in order to remove him or 
her from office; 
9. can initiate disciplinary proceedings against the mayor of the local government and 
against the chief executive before the mayor; 
10. initiate an audit of the local government’s book-keeping by the State Audit Office 
of Hungary; 
11. provide professional help to local governments in cases arising from its tasks and 
powers and 
12. impose a review of legality fine on the local government or on the partnership, in 
the cases determined by the law (Fábián & Hoffman, 2014, pp. 346-347).  
 
If the government office finds a government regulation of the government contrary to the 
Fundamental Law – after the unsuccessful application of the legality appeal or the 
convocation of the body of representatives – it presents its proposal for the revision of the 
local government regulation by the Constitutional Court to the Government, with the draft 
of the motion being sent to the minister responsible for review of legality for local 
governments. After having examined the proposal, the minister can call upon the county 
government office to propose revisions to the local government regulation by the 
Constitutional Court, in order to complete or modify the motion. The minister informs 
the county government office which proposed modifications to the government regulation 
by the Constitutional Court and the government whose regulation is being challenged. 
After this, the minister files a Government motion to review the conformity of the local 
government regulation with the Fundamental Law. The government office sends the draft 
of the motion simultaneously to the minister responsible for review of legality for local 
governments and to the affected local government. 
 
Within 15 days of receiving the information from the local government or after the 
unsuccessful expiration of the time allotted for providing information, the government 
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office can file decision at the Regional Courts which have administrative branches (the 8 
assigned regional courts from the 20 regional courts. The municipal decrees could be filed 
regardless of the above mentioned time limit at the Curia. Simultaneously with the 
launching of the litigation process, the government office sends the motion to the affected 
local government. 
 
The offending – individual – decisions can be annulled by the – (8) assigned – regional 
courts, and the offending normative decisions and decrees can be quashed by the Curia. 
If a decree or a normative resolution (or a specific part of a decree or the normative 
resolution) is quashed the decision of the Curia (or the decision of the administrative and 
labour court) should be published in the Hungarian Official Gazette. The rules of the 
litigation is regulated by the Act I of 2017 on the Code of the Administrative Litigation. 
The quashing procedure of the normative decisions and decreesof the municipalities have 
special rules which are regulated by the Chapter XXV of the Act I of 2017.   
 
The head of the county government office also have legislative powers and obligations. 
If the government office states that the body of representatives has not fulfilled its 
obligation to legislate, it can file – while simultaneously informing the local 
government – a statement of the local government’s neglect of its obligation to legislate 
with the Curia. If the local government does not fulfil its obligation to legislate within the 
deadline given by the Curia, the government office initiates proceedings in the Curia 
within 30 days of the termination of the deadline with the aim of allowing the government 
office to repair the negligence by the government office. The head of the government 
office enacts the regulation in the name of the local government, according to the rules 
for the regulations of the local government, so that the regulation is signed by the leader 
of the government office and is published in the Hungarian Official Gazette. The 
regulation enacted by the leader of the government office in the name of the local 
government has the status of a local governmental regulation, with the proviso that the 
local government is only authorized to modify it or to set it aside after the next local 
governmental election; before that time, only the leader of the government office is 
authorized to modify it. 
 
If we look at the new model, prima facie full legal protection is provided by this new 
model of judicial and constitutional review to individuals. If we look closer at the 
regulation several lacunas could be noticed. The main problem is, that now an individual 
cannot initiate directly the judicial review of a local government decree. We have 
mentioned above that only the judge of the case, the ombudsman and the county 
government office may submit a request to the Curia. The procedures aim to safeguard 
first of all public interest, and regard the safeguarding of subjective rights and positions 
only as an accessory aim of them. Although the individuals can submit a constitutional 
complaint to the Constitutional Court against the decisions of the courts by the 
individuals, the success of these procedures is highly doubtful, as a local government 
decree rarely violates exclusively the Fundamental Law without being contrary to lower 
sources of law. The unconstitutional local government decree often violates an act of the 
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Parliament or a decree of a central government organ and – if the constitutional complaint 
is based on the unconstitutionality of the applied decree – the decree cannot be reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court in lack of competence. Exclusively the Curia is licensed by 
the new constitution, by the Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation of the Courts and by 
the Act I of 2017 on the Code of the Administrative Litigation to the judicial review of 
the legality of the local government decree.  
 
8 Financial resources of local authorities and financial transfer system 
 
Firstly, I would like to analyse the regulation on the static element of the municipal 
financial system, the regulation on the municipal asset. The regulation on the assets of 
the local government has been transformed during the last few years. The last amendment 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary changed the article 12(2) of the 
Constitution, which was in force until 31st December 2011. The amendment allowed the 
Parliament to nationalize without any compensation the local government assets by an 
act, if the powers and duties of the local governments change, and the asset is related to 
such a task which does not belong to the new responsibilities of the municipality.  
 
This amendment was in harmony with the new regulation of the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary. The article 32(6) states that “assets controlled by municipal governments shall 
be public property, serving the performance of municipal government tasks.” According 
to this regulation, local government assets are are not separated from the assets of the 
central government, but rather these are together the national assets. Because of the local 
government asset is an integrated part of the national asset, it serves as the performance 
of the municipal tasks. Therefore if the responsible authority of the former municipal 
tasks has been changed, the asset may be free expropriated. Thus the local government 
asset can be classified as a kind of constitution of trust, which are is related to the tasks 
of the municipalities and it is not defended against the interventions of the central 
(parliamentary) legislation (Hoffman, 2013, p. 20 and Pálné, 2016, p. 84). 
 
Since 1st of January 2012 the main rules on municipal asset have been regulated by the 
Act CXCVI of 2011 on the National Assets (National Asset Code). The dual system of 
the municipal asset has been remained, because the local government asset can be either 
a core asset or a business asset. The core asset directly serves as the performance of the 
obligatory municipal tasks. The core asset has two components. The first component is 
the unfit core asset which is an asset owned exclusively by local governments and which 
is determined by the National Asset Code and by another Act or the decree of the local 
government. The second component is the limited marketable municipal asset which is 
defined by an Act (of the Parliament) or by a local government decree. The local roads, 
the local parks and public spaces, the international airports and waters – not including 
water utilities – which are owned by the municipalities belong to the exclusive municipal 
assets. The priority national assets owned by the municipalities – which is part of the 
unfit municipal assets – are determined by the Annex II of the Act on the National Assets 
and by the decrees of the Local Governments. Records must be kept on the core assets of 
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the local government. The public utilities owned by the municipalities; the local public 
buildings which are maintained by the local governments and their institutions; the 
ownership of the local government in a public service company with a municipal majority 
ownership and the ownership of the local governments in the Balaton Shipping Co. is 
defined by the Act on National Assets as limitedly marketable core asset. This condition 
is linked to the performance of the public functions as long as public services are 
performed by these assets their marketability is limited. The free exercise of the right of 
the municipal ownership is limited by the regulations of the National Asset Code. Thus 
the business activity of the local government may not risk the performance of municipal 
tasks. Therefore the local government may take part in those companies which have the 
limited liability of for the members. The local government may not take part in companies 
which have no transparent ownership structure. The local governments shall adopt a 
medium-and long-term asset management plan. The exclusive economic activities of local 
governments are determined by the Act on the National Assets which can be performed 
by the institutions (governed by public law) of the local governments, by municipal-
owned companies. The local governments can grant concession as well. Trust law can be 
established on the local government asset, which is regulated by the Municipal and the 
National Assets Codes. 
 
Thus regulation on municipal asset has been transformed significantly: the former 
independency of the municipal asset and the protection of it from the nationalization has 
been eliminated. The municipal asset can be interpreted as a trust-nature asset, which can 
be nationalized if the municipal tasks are centralized.  
 
Secondly, I would like to analyse the dynamics of the municipal finances, the municipal 
revenues, budgeting and control. Although it is a separated subsystem, the budget of the 
municipalities is part of the national budget. The separation does not exclude the subsidy 
of local governments by the state (by the central government).  The local government 
finance is based on the annual budget of the municipality.  The funding of the mandatory 
and voluntary municipal tasks and the delegated administrative powers is based on this 
legal norm. A significant change in the new Municipal Code is that the operational deficit 
cannot be planned, thus the expenditures of the performance of the municipal tasks shall 
not exceed the revenues. Therefore the deficit can be planned only for the financing of 
the investments and developments.  
 
The municipal tasks can be funded by own revenues, received funds and state subsidies. 
The Act on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary states that the local government is 
burdened by the consequences of loss management, and the central government is not 
responsible for the obligations of the municipalities (Kecső, 2013, p. 26).  
The following public revenues are considered municipal own revenues: incomes, fees and 
charges of municipal services and of municipal asset management,  dividend,  profit of 
the municipal business activity,  rent,  received funds as  private incomes of the local 
government and  local taxes,  fees and fines . Local taxes are the local business tax, the 
tourism tax, the communal tax of the individuals and the businesses, the land tax and 
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building tax.  The main changes of the regulation on own revenues are the new limitations 
of local credits. The permission of the Government of Hungary for local government 
borrowing was introduced by the article 34(5) of the Fundamental Law. The aim of this 
regulation is to prevent local government debt. This type of limitation is based on the 
regulations of several German provinces (Länder). Thus the Government has a prior 
consent to the local government borrowing. Detailed rules are regulated/established by 
the Act CXCIV of 2011 on the economic stability of Hungary. Shortly, in principle all 
loans and other transactions with a nature of loan (for example municipal bonds) shall be 
permitted by the Government. There are broad exceptions of this principle. For example 
there is a de minimis rule and illiquid loans do not need permission. Similarly, loans which 
are required for the financing of projects with the co-payment of the European Union and 
the reorganization credits linked to the municipal debt settlement process do not need the 
consent of the Government. Although there are other huge number of the exceptional 
cases, the financial freedom of local governments is significantly limited by this legal 
institution. The aim of this regulation was to prevent the indebtedness of the Hungarian 
municipalities.  
 
The assigned central taxes have remained as the revenues of the local governments, but 
their significance was weakened. Such an assigned central tax is the income tax of land 
rent.  
 
The regulation on state subsidies was significantly changed by the new Municipal Code. 
In 2013 a task-based financing system was introduced. Thus state subsidies are based on 
the mandatory (obligatory) tasks of the municipalities. Firstly they depend on the 
standards of the services defined by legal norms. The efficient management, the expected 
own revenue of the municipality and the actual revenues of the local self-governments 
have to be taken into account by the determination of the subsidies. The determination of 
this subsidy is based on the efficient local management, the expected own revenues of the 
municipalities and the actual local revenues. The main principle of the task-based 
financing system is the additional nature: the own revenues of local governments are 
complemented by the state subsidies, thus local communities are interested in collecting 
their own revenues (Kecső, 2013, pp. 27-28). The task-based subsidies are earmarked, 
thus the expenditure shall be spent on the financing of the obligatory and several – by the 
act on the annual central budget defined – voluntary tasks several – defined by the act on 
the annual central budget – by of the municipalities. The normative state subsidies of 
several local public services have remained. The services of the social care, of the 
kindergartens and several cultural services are directly financed and these supports are 
not integrated into the task-based funding. The complementary state subsidies remained: 
in exceptional cases, local self-governments that are disadvantaged through no fault of 
their own may receive this state subsidy in order to protect their independence and 
viability. 
 
Local governments are responsible for their economic management, thus local 
government can also go bankrupt. The procedure of liberating the bankrupt municipalities 
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from debts is regulated by the Act XXV of 1996.  
 
Another important field of the financial resources is the financial control of the 
municipalities. The legality of economic decisions is supervised by the county 
(metropolitan) government office. The economic activities of local governments are 
controlled by the State Audit Office of Hungary, which controls and monitors the legality, 
expediency and effectiveness of these decisions. The subsidies co-paid by the European 
Union are controlled by an independent regime. New element is the ASP (Application 
Service Provider) system which allows to the State Treasury a real-time control on the 
municipal finances. The financial control and monitoring within the municipal 
organization system were amended partially. Similarly to the former regulation, the 
internal control is conducted by the municipal clerk. The internal audit has been 
simplified by the new Municipal Code because the audit by independent auditor 
companies is no longer required by the municipal law.  
 
Summarizing the financial freedom of local governments and the defence of assets: they 
were weakened by the new regulations of the municipal law. Thus the financial autonomy 
of the municipalities is very limited in the new Hungarian municipal system. These 
changes have been justified by the prevention of the local government debt and by more 
efficient national asset management. 
 
9 Local authorities' right to associate 
 
First of all, it should be mentioned, that the right to establish cooperation with foreign 
municipalities have been recognized by the former Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary and the by Fundamental Law of Hungary, as well. The cooperation with foreign 
municipalities is widespread in Hungary, practically every town have foreign partner 
municipalities, and a significant number of the villages have similar partnerships, as 
w29ell (Fazekas et al., p. 298-300). 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, the regulation of the Ötv on the inter-municipal cooperation 
was based on a diversified and differentiated system. The basic rules on the inter-
municipal associations were regulated by the Ötv, but the definitions on the types of these 
associations and the rules on the organization and finance of these forms were regulated 
by the Act CXXXV of 1997 on the Inter-municipal associations and the cooperation of 
the local governments. There were acts on specific types of the associations. Such acts 
were the Act CVII of 2004 on the Inter-municipal Associations of the Small Regions and 
the Act XXI of 1996 on the Regional Development and Planning which contained rules 
on the regional development associations. The Act CVII of 2004 was based on the French 
model, it was strongly influenced by the loi Chevènement11. An important difference was 
that – as I have mentioned earlier – the former Hungarian constitutional regulation was 
 
11 Loi no 99-586 du 12 juillet 1999 relative au renforcement et à la simplification de la coopération 
intercommunale (loi Chevènement) 
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based on the voluntary cooperation of the municipalities. Therefore the different types 
and forms of inter-municipal associations were encouraged by financial aid of the central 
government. Thus a significant growth of the number of the cooperative forms was 
resulted by this new model of diversified, state-supported inter-municipal system (see 
Table 2) 
 
Table 2:  Number of service provider inter-municipal associations from 1992 to 2005 
 
Year Number of the inter-municipal associations 






2003 1 274 
2005 1 586 
Source :Hoffman et al., 2016, p. 460. 
 
This diversified system has been replaced by a unified model. The general rules on the 
inter-municipal associations are regulated by the Chapter IV of the Act CLXXXIX of 
2011 on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary, but there are other legal institutions 
which have the nature of an inter-municipal cooperation. These legal institutions are 
regulated by other public law instruments. As it was  mentioned above, the article 34(2) 
of the Fundamental Law of Hungary  allows  the Parliament to require the performance 
of an obligatory municipal task by inter-municipal cooperation. The Parliament can 
establish by an act a mandatory inter-municipal association. The Chapter IV of the 
Municipal Code does not contain rules on these mandatory established associations, but 
other articles of this Act have such rules. 
 
The amendments of the Act on the Local Self-Governments of Hungary have dual nature. 
Firstly, the formerly differentiated system in which there were institutionalized several 
types of the inter-municipal associations has been simplified. Only one type of the inter-
municipal associations is regulated by the new Municipal Code: the association with legal 
personality. Secondly, the formerly separated – regulated (Józsa, 2006, pp. 106-107) in 
the Act CXXXV of 1997 on the Inter-municipal Cooperation and Associations and in the 
Act CVII of 2004 on the Associations in the Small Regions – legal norms were 
incorporated in the Municipal Code. The section 87 of the Municipal Code states that the 
representative bodies (councils) of the municipalities may form inter-municipal 
associations with legal personality in order to more efficiently and appropriately perform 
one or more municipal tasks or the delegated tasks of the mayor and the clerk. Although 
only the association with legal personality is declared by the Act on the Local Self-
Governments of Hungary the new rules allows to establish different service delivery 
districts within the associations. Thus the new associations are mainly umbrella 
associations which unify more inter-municipal cooperation with different participating 
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local governments. The association shall be established by a written agreement of the 
participant local governments. It is based on the decisions of the representative body. 
These decisions have been made by qualified majorities of the bodies. A decision with 
qualified majority is required for the access to the association, as well.  Access can take 
place on the first day of the year (1st January) having regard to the legal personality of the 
association. The secession can take place – for similar reasons – on the last day of the 
year (31st December). The representative body shall decide on the access or the separation 
at least six month earlier and the body shall inform the council of the association shall be 
notified of the intention of separation or access (Nagy & Hoffman, 2016, pp. 302-312). 
 
The association can establish organizations governed by public law, companies, non-
profit organizations and other form of organizations for the performance of the public 
task. Because of the legal personality of the association, it has an asset which is separated 
from the local governments which established this cooperation, but this asset is a part of 
the national asset. In the legal disputes related to the associations, the courts of public 
administration and labour have jurisdictions. Formerly the ordinary, civil courts have had 
jurisdictions in these cases, because these disputes were considered by the legislation – 
which was in force until 31st December 2012 – as disputes governed by private law (see 
the decisions No. 5.Pf.20.332/2008/4. of and No. Pfv.X.20.104/2009/4. of the Hungarian 
Supreme Court). The procedural rules on the juridical review of the inter-municipal cases 
changed significantly after January 1st 2018: these disputes are interpreted as special 
administrative remedies, and the procedures are regulated by the Act I of 2017 on the 
Code of the Administrative Litigation.  
 
If there is no other rule in the agreement on the association, the participant local 
government shall financially support the association proportionally in proportion to the 
number of their population. The cessation cases of the association and the mandatory 
elements of the agreement on the inter-municipal association are defined by the Act on 
the Local Self-Governments of Hungary. 
 
The central organ of the inter-municipal association is the council of the association, 
whose members are delegated by the representative bodies of the participant local 
governments. The members of the council have a vote which is defined by the agreement. 
The decisions of the councils are made by in the form of a resolution because the 
associations do not have legislative powers.  
 
The legal supervision tasks are performed by the county (metropolitan government) 
offices. Thus the government office can convene the council, and it can initiate a lawsuit 
at the court of public administration and labour on the grounds of violation of law and the 
government office may impose a fine of legal supervision. 
 
Because of the lack of the incentives and the centralized municipal tasks – practically the 
main tasks of the former associations were centralized, and these tasks are performed now 
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by the central government and by its agencies – the number of the voluntary association 
seriously – by approx. 40% – dropped (see Table 3) 
 
Table 3:  Number of the (voluntary) intercommunal associations in 2013 and 2014 
 




Source: Balázs & Hoffman, 2017, p. 16.  
 
Two other form of the inter-municipal cooperation is regulated by the Mötv: the fully 
integration of the municipal organization and finance, the associated representative body 
of the settlements and the integration of the administrative organization of the local 
governments, the common office of the settlements. The associatied representative body 
can establish by the representative bodies of the given settlements. The annual budget is 
united by this form of cooperation and a common municipal office and common 
municipal institutions are maintained. As I have mentioned earlier, the joint municipal 
offices of the villages (and exceptionally the common office of the towns and the villages) 
can be interpreted as mandatory inter-municipal associations. This form of cooperation 
is the mandatory integration of the administrative organization of the small Hungarian 
municipalities. The result of this new regulation is a heavy concentration process: in 2014, 
the major form of local administration was already the joint municipal office (see Table 
4).  
Table 4:  Municipal offices and joint municipal offices in Hungary (2014) 
 
Joint municipal offices Number of the 
(independent) 
municipal offices 
(mayor’s offices) in 
Hungary 
Number of the local 
municipalities in 
Hungary  
Number of the 
joint municipal 
offices 
Number of the 
participant 
municipalities  
749 2632 521 3,153  
Source: Fazekas et al., 2015, p. 299 
 
The municipalities tried to fight this centralization process. Several municipalities, even 
though obliged, did not join the joint municipal offices. When the commissioner of 
government replaced their consent to the agreement, and joined them forcedly to a joint 
municipal office, these municipalities sued these decisions before administrative courts. 
Several judges handling such cases turned to the Constitutional Court. The judicial 
applications accepted by the Court stated the regulation to be contrary to the European 
Charter of Local Governments. The provisions of the Mötv on the joint municipal office 
were seen to infringe Article 6, which gives the freedom of determination of  appropriate 
administrative structures, and Article 4 para 6 on the duty of preliminary consultation in 
the planning and decision-making processes for all matters which concern local 
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governments. The Constitutional Court did not annul the contested rules, in its decision 
22/2015. (June 15) it stated that the freedom of municipalities regarding the determination 
of their administrative structures has its limits in the provisions of the Fundamental law 
and other statutes setting up rules on these structures. The municipalities have to consider 
these rules. The Court stressed that the municipalities have the possibility to mutually 
agree with other municipalities on the joint municipal office within the fixed time limits 
given by the Mötv. The government commissioner can only act, if the municipality did 
not fulfil its duty. The possibility of the government commissioner to decide on the forced 
joining of a municipality to an office or to replace the agreement establishing the office 
is an extraordinary last tool, which is necessary for ensuring the effective administration 
and the right of the inhabitants to self-government. The need for effective administration 
entitles the state administration to intervene, and the infringed tool of the supervisory 
authority is in line with Article 8 para 1 of the Charter, too. The only point where the 
Constitutional Court accepted the applications was the infringement of Article 4 para 6 
of the Charter. It held that an unconstitutional omission exists, because of the lack of rules 
for the consultation with the affected local governments. The Court obliged the legislator 
to heal the omission until the end of 2015, but the new regulation was passed only in 2018 
(Act CXXI of 2018) and it entered into force only on January 1st 2019.  
 
Thus the Hungarian inter-municipal system is an important element of the local 
governance in Hungary which is connected to the fragmented spatial structure. The model 
is based on the voluntary cooperation, however the mandatory cooperation was 
established by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The voluntary associations are 
responsible for the joint provision of local public services, The mandatory common 
municipal offices are responsible for the local administration. The regulation on 
mandatory common municipal offices was revised by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court. An unconstitutional omission was stated because they have not been 
institutionalized regulation on the consultation with the municipalities when the common 
municipal offices are established by the agency of the central government. The omission 
was repaired by the Act CXXI of 2018.  
 
10 Legal protection of local self -government 
 
It is stated generally by the article 5 of the Mötv that the lawful exercise of the municipal 
powers are protected by the courts and by the Constitutional Court. Although this is a 
general statement, the actual regulations on the legal protection of local self-governments 
are defined by the Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, by the Mötv and by the 
Act I of 2017 on the Code of the Administrative Court Procedure.  
 
Thus there is a general statement on the protection of the municipal powers, but a suit for 
the defence of the municipal rights have not been institutionalized by the new Hungarian 
regulation. The acts of the Parliament and the decrees of the central government which 
violate the self-governance of the municipalities cannot be sued. As I have mentioned 
earlier, the municipal autonomy is interpreted as the constitutionally defended powers of 
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the local governments, but they are not interpreted as fundamental rights. These rules 
cannot be directly sued by the municipalities, because the former action popularis of the 
a posteriori constitutional review of these acts and decrees was abolished. As I have 
mentioned earlier, this constitutional review can be initiated by the Government of 
Hungary, by the quarter of the members of the Parliament, by the president of the Curia, 
the Prosecutor General and by the ombudsman. The municipalities did not have the right 
to sue these acts.  
 
Although the constitutional complaint has been institutionalized as a lawsuit against the 
unconstitutional rules this complaint can be brought in the case of the infringement of 
fundamental rights. As I have mentioned earlier, the municipal autonomy is not 
interpreted as fundamental right, thus this complaint cannot be practically initiated by the 
municipalities.  
 
Therefore the protection of the local self-government is indirect in the Hungarian legal 
system: these procedures can be initiated by the above mentioned bodies, therefore the 
municipalities shall ask these bodies. Thus the legal protection of the Hungarian local 
government cannot be interpreted as a strong and efficient system.  
 
11 Future challenges of the implementation of the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government in ... legislation 
 
The Hungarian system based on the European Charter of Local Governments was one of 
the most decentralized municipal systems in Europe. Due to the fragmented spatial 
structure and broad responsibilities of the local governments, serious inefficiency 
problems evolved in the Hungarian self-governance.  
 
This model has been changed after 2011/2012 after the new Hungarian constitution. The 
elements of the new model introduced in 2011/2012 are not unknown in European 
democracies. It is rather the mixture of these elements, which is unfamiliar: a strong 
centralization of the delivery of former local public services, and at the same time the 
concentration of the local public administration. The former concentration of the local 
government system partially remained, but the inter-municipal associations are now 
mainly responsible for the joined local administrative tasks, which turns this form of 
concentration into a mode of centralization in its effects. Now, Hungary has a very 
centralized local administration system, in which the autonomy and the service provider 
role of the local governments (and their inter-municipal entities) have been largely 
weakened. This transformation has been a much stronger centralization than the changes 
in the European countries after 2008/2009.  
 
Although a strong centralization has taken place, the resistance was relatively limited. 
The new approach on the local autonomy of the political decision-makers will not alter 
in short time, and there is not a strong request for the change of this concept among the 
experts and scientists. It seems to be that the changes are noted by the Hungarian decision-
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makers, local politicians, by the councils of the Hungarian municipalities and by the 
scientists and experts.  
 
The new municipal regulation was strongly criticized by the Monitoring Committee of 
the Charter. The revision of the new municipal regulation was recommended by the 
Recommendation 341 (2013) of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities12. The 
recommendation stated that the constitutional guarantees of the local governance were 
significantly weakened, the financial autonomy and the judicial protection of the rights 
of the Hungarian municipalities is not enough sufficient, the competences of the counties 
should be strengthened, and the consultation between the central and local government 
should be not only formal as it has been institutionalized by the new rules.  
 
Although the rules of the new regulation are basically consistent with the Charter, the 
new regulation could be interpreted as an actual backward. The role of the municipalities 
have been significantly weakened which can be observed by the municipal expenditures. 
In 2010 the municipal expenditures were 12,5% of the GDP and in 2017 only 6,3% (in 
the EU-28 in 2010 the municipal expenditures were 11,9% and in 2017 10,7% of the 
GDP) (see Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1:  Local government (in the % of the GDP) expenditures in the EU-28 and in 





language=en, downloaded at April 15th 2018) 
 
Thus the main challenge of the recent municipal legislation in Hungary the centralization 
of the local administration. The municipalities should find their place and role in the new, 
strongly centralized Hungarian public administration. 
 
12 The Recommendation can be found at https://rm.coe.int/168071910d#_Toc371513645 
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 






Balázs, I. (2014) L’intercommunalité en Hongrie, In Steckel-Assouère, M.C. (ed.) Regards croisés 
sur les mutations de l’intercommunalité. (Paris: L’Harmattan), pp. 425-435. 
Balázs, I. & Hoffman, I. (2017) Can (Re)Centralization Be a Modern Governance in Rural Areas? 
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 50/E, pp. 5-20.  
Beluszky, P. (2004) Magyarország településföldrajza. Általános rész (Budapest & Pécs: Dialóg 
Campus 2004). 
Bodnár, E. & Dezső, M. (2010) Decentralized Authorities, In Dezső, M. (ed.) Constitutional Law 
in Hungary (Alphen an Rijn: Kluwer Law International), pp. 219-240.  
Bowman, A. O-M' & Kearney, R. C. (2014) State and Local Government. The Essentials (Boston: 
Cengage Learning). 
Fábián, A. (2017) Local Self-Government in Hungary: the Impact of Crisis, In: Nunes Silva, C. & 
Buček, J. (eds.) Local Government and Urban Governance in Europe (Cham: Springer), pp. 
71-88.  
Fábián, A. & Hoffman, I. (2014) Local Self-Governments, In: Patyi, A. & Rixer, Á. (eds.) 
Hungarian Public Administration and Administrative Law. (Passau: Schenk Verlag), pp. 320-
349. 
Fazekas, J., Fazekas, M., Hoffman, I., Rozsnyai, K. & Szalai, É. (20152) Közigazgatási jog. 
Általános rész I. (Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó). 
Fonyó, Gy. (ed.) A tanácstörvény magyarázata. (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó).  
Gergely, A. (2009) Reform and Revolution: 1830 – 1849 (Budapest: Social Science Monographs) 
Hoffman, I. (2013) Az önkormányzati döntések kontrolljának főbb modelljei a nyugati 
demokráciákban, Közjogi Szemle, 6(4), pp. 34-43.  
Hoffman, I. (2011) A helyi önkormányzatok társulási rendszerének főbb vonásai, Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás 4 (1), pp. 24-34. 
Hoffman, I. (2012) Some Thoughts on the System of Tasks of the Local Autonomies Related to the 
Organisation of Personal Social Care, Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Governments, 10(4), 
pp. 323-340.  
Hoffman, I. (2013) Átalakuló önkormányzati vagyon – az alkotmányos szabályok és a sarkalatos 
törvények tükrében, Jegyző és Közigazgatás 14 (3), pp. 19-22.  
Hoffman, I., Fazekas, J. & Rozsnyai, K. (2016) Concentrating or Centralising Public Services? The 
Changing Roles of the Hungarian Inter-municipal Associations in the last Decades, Lex Localis 
– Journal of Local Self-Governments, 14(3), pp. 451-471.   
Horváth, M.T. (2015) Magasfeszültség. Városi szolgáltatások (Budapest & Pécs: Dialóg-Campus) 
Jakab, A. & Fröhlich, J. (2017) The Constitutional Court of Hungary, In: Jakab, A., Dyevre, J. & 
Itzcovich, G. (eds.) Comparative Constitutional Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 394-437. 
Józsa, Z. (2006) Önkormányzati szervezet, funkció, modernizáció (Pécs – Budapest: Dialóg 
Campus) 
Kecső, G. (2013) A helyi önkormányzatok gazdálkodásának reformja és az adósságrendezési 
eljárás módosításai. Új Magyar Közigazgatás, 6(7-8), pp. 26-37.  
Kiss, L. (1985) Az igazgatási társulások helye, szerepe és fejlesztésük irányai Baranya megyében, 
In: Ádám, A. & Farkas, K. (eds.) Államigazgatás, terület- és településpolitika (Tanulmányok 
Baranya megyéből) (Pécs: JPTE) 
Kjellberg, F. (1995) The Changing Values of Local Government, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 540, (Local Governance around the World) pp. 40-
50.  
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 




Kovács A. Gy. (2017) Különleges közigazgatási perek és egyéb közigazgatási bírósági eljárások, 
In: Fazekas, M. (ed.) Közigazgatási jog. Általános rész III. (Budapest: ELTE Eötvös), pp. 423-
432.  
Mezey, B., Bódiné Beliznai, K., Föglein, G., Horváth., A., Máthé, G., Révész, T. M., Stipta, I. & 
Völgyesi, L. (2003) Magyar alkotmánytörténet (Budapest: Osiris) 
Nagy, M. & Hoffman, I. (2016) A Magyarország helyi önkormányzatairól szóló törvény 
magyarázata. Harmadik, hatályosított és átdolgozott kiadás (Budapest: HVG-Orac). 
Nagy, M. (2017) A helyi-területi önkormányzatok és az Alaptörvény, Közjogi Szemle, 10(4), pp. 
16-27. 
Pálné Kovács, I. (2016) A magyar területi közigazgatási reformok főbb állomásai, In: Pálné Kovács, 
I. (ed.) A magyar decentralizáció kudarca nyomában. (Budapest & Pécs: Dialóg Campus), pp. 
73-85.  
Péteri, G. (1993) Market as Pressure or Market as Possibility? The Framework of Local Economic 
Development in Hungary, In: Goetz, E. G. & Clarke, S. E. (eds.) The New Localism. 
Comparative Urban Politics in a Global Era. (London: SAGE), pp. 102-116.7 
Rozsnyai, K. (2013) A területszervezésre vonatkozó szabályok az Mötv.-ben., Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás 6 (7-8), pp. 37-48.  
Soós, G. & Kákai, L. (2011) Hungary: Remarkable Success and Costly Failures: an Evaluation of 
Subnational Democracy, In: Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F. & Lidström, A. The Oxford Handbook 
of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 528-551.  
Szente, Z. (2013) Hungary. Local Government in Hungary: A creeping centralisation?, In: Panara, 
C. & Varney, M (eds.) Local Government in Europe. The ‘fourth level’ in the EU multilayered 
governance (London & New York: Routledge), pp. 151-182.  
Verebélyi, I. (ed.) (1999) Az önkormányzati rendszer magyarázata (Budapest: KJK-Kerszöv). 
Zongor, G. (2000) A lebegő megyétől a politizáló megyéig, Comitatus, 10(9), pp. 17-23.
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 
I. Hoffman: Local Self-Government in Hungary 
244 
 
 
 
